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SECTION 6013(e): CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THE INNOCENT SPOUSE
INTRODUCTION
A husband and wife are granted an annual option of either filing
separate tax returns or a joint tax return.' Since 1948, the tax savings
obtained by filing joint returns' have realistically foreclosed the desir-
ability of married couples filing separate returns. It is questionable,
however, whether spouses who file joint returns fully comprehend the
significance of this election. While such an election often produces a tax
savings, it also imposes joint and several liability for any deficiency in
the return.'
The imposition of joint and several liability is inconsequential to a
large majority of couples who annually file joint tax returns. Such
liability, however, is crucial to the wife whose husband omits reportable
income from their joint return and thereafter makes his whereabouts
unknown.5 Subsequently, the wife receives a notice6 from the Internal
Revenue Service that deficiencies have been assessed7 against her for
the tax due on the omitted funds. In similar situations the Internal
Revenue Service has been successful in collecting such deficiencies from
the wife, even when she is innocent of any wrongdoing and has no
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013; Treas. Reg. § 1.6016-1(a) (1) (1954).
2. The income tax due on a joint return filed after 1948 is "twice the tax which
would be imposed if the taxable income were cut in half." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
2(a). This provision enables spouses to split their income and receive tax savings
because of the progressive structure of the income tax rates. See notes 24-31 infra and
accompanying text.
3. "[I]f a joint return is made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income
and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several." INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 6013(d) (3). Such liability is imposed upon spouses for any "deficiencies" in
the return. A deficiency is defined as the difference between the amount of liability as
computed by the taxpayers on their return and the amount of tax liability as computed
by the Internal Revenue Service. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6211(a). Such liability may
include not only the resulting tax and interest due on the omitted funds but also the
various penalties imposed for negligent or fraudulent filing. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 6651, 6653. See 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55.01 (1969).
4. A husband could also be held jointly and severally liable if his wife omitted
reportable income from their joint return.
5. It is not uncommon for a husband to disappear under such circumstances and
thereby prevent the Internal Revenue Service from collecting the tax deficiency from
him. See Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969); H.R. REP. No.
1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) ; S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
6. A notice of deficiency is sent by either certified or registered mail to the last
known address of each spouse. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6212.
7. For the method of assessment see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6202-04.
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knowledge of nor benefit from the omitted funds.' A wife under such
circumstances will hereinafter be referred to as an "innocent spouse."
While the concept of joint and several liability has been consistently
applied in situations involving an innocent spouse,9 recent congressional
legislation" has attempted to ameliorate this inequitable area of the tax
law. The purpose of this note is to examine this legislation and to con-
sider its potential value to the innocent spouse.
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A husband and wife were first permitted to file a joint income tax
return under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918.1 The first
attempt to impose joint and several liability on these returns was made
in a 1923 Revenue Ruling;12 however, this concept did not receive
judicial acceptance until 1933 in Frida Hellman Cole."3 The Board of
Tax Appeals in Cole sustained joint and several liability on the grounds
that: 1) it was impossible to compute the separate liabilities of each
spouse when a joint return is filed;" and 2) apportionment of tax
liability according to the separate incomes of each spouse would be
tantamount to allowing the filing of separate returns after a joint return
had been filed."9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the Board of Tax Appeals in Cole v. Commissioner,"9 ruling that there
8. Horn v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Moore v. United States,
360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Spanos v. United States, 323 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1963) ;
Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Furnish v. Commissioner, 262
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958).
9. See cases cited note 8 supra.
10. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e). See notes 68-111 infra and accompanying
text.
11. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
18, § 223(b) (2), 42 Stat. 250, added the provision whereby the amount of tax due on a
joint return was to be computed on the aggregate income so reported.
12. I.T. 1575, 11-1 CuM. BULL. 144 (1923) held that "a single joint return is one
return of a taxable unit and not two returns on one sheet of paper. Accordingly . . .
they are individually liable for the full amount of tax. ..
13. 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933).
14. This rationale is based on the assumption that the administrative convenience
of the Internal Revenue Service requires the imposition of joint and several liability
when a joint return is filed since a joint return does not show the respective incomes and
deductions of a, husband and wife, and the tax is computed on the aggregate income
reported. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 223(b) (2), 42 Stat. 250.
15. It has previously been held that separate returns cannot be filed once a joint
return has been submitted. Grant v. Rose, 24 F,2d 115 (N.D. Ga. 1928), aff'd, 39 F.2d
340 (5th Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 283 U.S. 867 (1931).
16. 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935). Subsequent to this reversal, the Board of Tax
Appeals abandoned the imposition of joint and several liability upon joint returns,
holding that the liability on such returns was proportionate to the individual income
of each spouse.
For a detailed case history of joint and several returns following Cole until 1938
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was no provision in the Revenue Acts on which to base joint and
several liability." In addition, the court rejected the Commissioner's
argument that administrative convenience justified the imposition of
such liability by holding that the liability on a joint return is propor-
tionate to the income of each spouse.'
The question of whether joint and several liability was to be imposed
on joint returns was not settled until congressional action incorporated
such liability provisions into the Revenue Act of 1938."9 The only
statement made by the House Committee on Ways and Means con-
cerning this statutory enactment was that such action was "[n]ecessary
for administrative reasons, [and] that any doubt as to the existence of
such liability should be put at rest, if the privilege of filing such joint
returns is continued."2  Apparently the Committee reasoned that
such liability was necessary to facilitate collections and, in addition, was
the price to be paid for the tax benefits married persons received through
the filing of a joint return. It is submitted that neither of these reasons
provided a satisfactory explanation nor justification for imposing joint
and several liability on joint returns prior to 1948.21 The administrative
convenience doctrine lacks validity when one considers that the Internal
Revenue Service operated without such liability for a period of three
years subsequent to Cole. Furthermore, the separation of the individual
liabilities of spouses is also feasible as exemplified by the tax laws of
of England.22 The Committee's rationalization that the filing of a joint
return is a privilege, and therefore the imposition of joint and several
liability is justified because of the tax benefits granted, is also question-
see Ritz, The Married Woman and the Federal Income Tax, 14 TAx L. REv. 437, 445
n.62 (1959).
17. 81 F.2d 485. Such a provision did not appear until 1938. Revenue Act of 1938,
ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447.
18. 81 F.2d at 488. The Court reasoned that
[m]atters urged to defeat a liberal view of the statute, for example, that
"great additional labor would be required," etc., are (in varying degree)
potent against the whole theory of revision, or against any comprehensive
"system of corrective justice."
Id.
19. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447. These provisions were
retained by the Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110, which are the
predecessors of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2(a), 6013(d) (3).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 30 (1938).
21. For arguments that imposition of such liability was justified see Erwin,
Federal Taxes and the Family, 20 S. CAL. L. REv. 243, 252 (1947) ; Comment, Joint
Income Tax Returns Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 289, 300 (1948).
22. Under the English system of taxation, either spouse may petition to have his
separate liability apportioned according to his relative income. Finance Act of 1961,
14(3) ; Finance Act of 1957, § 14(2); I.T.A. 1952, § 358. See also 1965 B.T.R. 298;
1960 B.T.R. 285, 1955 B.T.R. 134.
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able. The tax savings available by filing a joint return prior to 1948 were
negligible and, furthermore, were limited to only a small percentage of
the persons eligible to file joint returns. The only situation in which
spouses could obtain a tax benefit at this time was when one spouse had
considerable capital gains which he could offset against capital losses of
the other spouse." Spouses who were not in such a position obtained
no benefit by filing a joint return and therefore should not have been
jointly and severally liable prior to 1948.
The Revenue Act of 194824 introduced the "income-splitting"
formula which resulted in substantial tax savings to spouses who elected
to file joint returns. Before income-splitting was adopted, there existed a
vast difference in the amount of tax owed by a husband and wife,
depending upon whether they resided in a community property state 5 or
one adhering to the common law. 26 This inequality existed because the
Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn" held that for income tax purposes,
a husband and wife living in a community property state were entitled
to file separate returns, each treating one-half of their community income
as his or her respective income. 28 This treatment allowed a reduction of
their income tax because of the progressive structure of the tax rates.
Persons residing in common law states did not enjoy this same advantage,
and therefore, many states began adopting community property systems.29
Income splitting was adopted by the Revenue Act of 1948"0 to remedy this
situation. Since 1948, spouses in all states are able to obtain the income
tax benefits of splitting their income by filing a joint return."
23. See 1 J. RABBIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 5.01 (1970).
24. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110.
25. Ownership of income is divided between spouses in community property states.
United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
7.20 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
26. For a detailed discussion of the treatment of joint income tax returns in com-
munity property and common law states see 3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 19.01 (1965).
27. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
28. This principle of taxation arises not out of any specific statutory language
but rests on the determination by the United States Supreme Court that the
statutory provision imposing a tax on the net income "of every individual"
denotes ownership and the incidence of tax follows the ownership of income.
3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 19.01, at 2-4 (1969).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1948); S. REP. No. 1012, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1948).
30. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110.
31. The income tax due on a joint return filed after 1948 is "... twice the tax
which would be imposed if the taxable income were cut in half." INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2(a), formerly Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110.
The savings produced by "income splitting" have been reduced after 1970 by the
1969 Tax Reform Act because of the disparity in tax rates between single and married
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Although it could be argued that joint and several liability was not
the price paid for the tax benefits obtained by filing a joint return prior
to 1948,2 such liability is presently justified because of the additional
tax savings obtained by the majority of spouses who split"3 their
incomes. Such savings benefit both spouses because both are a part of the
same economic unit. 4 An innocent spouse, however, receives no tax
benefit on the omitted income by filing a joint return and, therefore,
should not be jointly and severally liable. Such a spouse receives only the
tax liability for the omitted funds which she never possessed.
JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE IMPOSITION OF JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Judicial application of the concept of joint and several liability
subsequent to its statutory enactment8 5 was, at first, consistent in holding
spouses jointly and severally liable for any deficiencies on joint returns.8"
The congressional mandate of section 6013(d) (3)7 was strictly inter-
preted to include even the innocent spouse who had no knowledge of, nor
benefit from, the unreported funds on which deficiencies were assessed."
Such automatic imposition of liability on innocent spouses created not
only harsh and inequitable case law,39 but also prompted writers to
propose the complete abolition of all joint and several liability.4
The judicial response"' to the plight of the innocent spouse was the
persons. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1(a), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
§ 803 (a). The statute uses existing joint return rates but has reduced the rates for
other individuals. However, some savings are still obtained by filing a joint return.
See 1 J. RA3BIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GirT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 5.01
(1970).
32. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text.
34. For an excellent discussion that the comparative benefits accorded each spouse
when a joint return is filed does not justify the imposition of joint and several liability,
see Note, The Joint Return and the Innocent Wife, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 351, 356 (1967).
35. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447.
36. See generally Horn v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Moore v.
United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1966); Spanos v. United States, 323 F.2d 108
(4th Cir. 1963) ; Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963); Furnish v.
Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958); Howell v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 240
(6th Cir. 1949).
37. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(d) (3).
38. See Myra S. Howell, 10 T.C. 859 (1948); Lucille Wenker, 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1237 (1966).
39. See Estate of Merlin H. Aylesworth, 24 T.C. 134 (1955).
40. Ritz, The Married Woman and the Federal Income Tax, 14 TAx L. REv. 437,
448 (1959); Note, The Joint Return and the Innocent Wife, 29 U. PITT. L. R v. 351,
364 (1967).
41. Although there has never been a widespread judicial movement to overturn
joint and several liability as applied to the innocent spouse, particularly in the federal
courts, the judicially created exceptions of the defenses of fraud and duress have
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allowance of an exception to joint and several liability when a spouse's
signature on a joint return was procured by fraud or duress.42 The
defenses of fraud and duress have not, however, provided adequate
protection for the innocent spouse. The courts have had difficulty in
developing satisfactory standards in applying these defenses and con-
sequently the results have been unpredictable. One court has indicated
that despite the failure of the revenue statutes and regulations to define
duress, a spouse may be relieved of liability under circumstances where
she was unwilling to sign a joint return but was forced to do so." Another
court has stated, however, that a long course of mental intimidation of a
wife by her husband resulting in her signing a joint return is necessary
to show duress."4 These distinctions become meaningless when applied
to factual situations. It is submitted that the success or failure of the
defense of duress is predicated only upon a subjective determination of
the voluntariness of a spouse's signature. Merlin H. Aylesworth45 is
illustrative of the inequity involved in such standardless determinations.
The Tax Court found in Aylesworth that a wife's signature on a joint
return was voluntary, despite her testimony that her husband had
threatened to "destroy her father" and "mutilate her face" if she did not
sign the return. 6
The standards used in ascertaining the validity of a defense of
fraud also vary according to the court making the determination. One
court has suggested that the Restatement of Contracts definition of fraud
should be used in determining whether a spouse was fraudulently induced
to sign a joint return," while another court has stated that local law
provided some relief to the innocent spouse. A few courts have expressed dissatisfaction
with this type of liability. See Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.
1969) ; Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Furnish v. Commissioner,
262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958); Betty Bell Wissing, 54 T.C. 1428 (1970). See also
Sharewell v. Commissioner, 419 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969).
42. Estate of Merlin H. Aylesworth, 24 T.C. 134 (1955); Ethel S. Hickey, 24
P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 457 (1955). Mistake may also be a defense. Payne v. United States,
247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957).
The bases for allowing the defenses of fraud and duress are that the necessary
intent to file a joint return is not present when the signature is coerced, and, in addition,
a coerced signature is equated to an involuntary act which is treated as never having
occurred. Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958); Hazel Stanley, 45
T.C. 555 (1966) ; Estate of Merlin H. Aylesworth, 24 T.C. 134 (1955).
43. Hazel Stanley, 45 T.C. 555 (1966).
44. Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958).
45. 24 T.C. 134 (1955).
46. Id. at 145.
47. The court in Betty Bell Wissing, 54 T.C. 1428 (1970) stated that
[c]ourts in resolving this issue [voluntariness] have naturally drawn upon
the analysis and terminology developed under state law to deal with analogous
problems. But the issue is one of Federal Law, . . . and uniform Federal
Standards must control.
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should be applied."8
Although the judicial exceptions of fraud and duress partially
alleviated the harshness of imposing joint and several liability on an
innocent spouse, the inability of the courts to develop uniform federal
standards in applying these exceptions created confusion. Some courts
appear to have refuted joint and several liability in these circumstances
merely because they were sympathetic for the wife. It should be apparent
from a brief survey of the case law in this area that the judicial attempts
to eliminate the imposition of liability upon the innocent spouse were
inadequate and inconsistent in their application, and therefore, congres-
sional action was needed for her protection.
THE HUELSMAN LITIGATION
The movement to exempt the innocent spouse from the joint and
several liability provisions of section 6013 (d) (3) 9 gained momentum
from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Huelsman v. Commissioner."° In
Huelsman, the court disregarded what for thirty years had been held
to be the congressional mandate of joint and several liability and
created a new approach to the application of such liability in cases in-
volving an innocent spouse. The court's liberal interpretation of section
6013(d) (3) reflected judicial dissatisfaction concerning the inequities
which were present in this area of tax law,"' and it is conceivable that
the Huelsman litigation provided the impetus needed to prompt Congress
to remedy the plight of the innocent spouse.
In Huelsman, the petitioner filed joint income tax returns for the
years 1963-65 with her husband which failed to report as income funds
that he had embezzled from business associates. Petitioner's husband was
convicted in 1965 for obtaining money under false pretenses and the
Commissioner assessed deficiencies in the amount of $25,187.67 against
the petitioner for the tax due on the unreported funds." The petitioner
sought review in the Tax Court of the Commissioner's deficiencies on
Id. at 1431. The Tax Court then applied the Restatement of Contracts §§ 475, 476
(1932) definitions of fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution to determine if
a spouse had been fraudulently induced to sign a joint return.
48. See Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958). See generally
Nadine I. Davenport, 48 T.C. 921 (1967) ; Marie A. Dolan, 44 T.C. 420 (1965).
49. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6013 (d) (3).
50. 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
51. Id. at 480.
52. The activities of petitioner's husband in obtaining these funds led to his con-
vicition in November, 1965 for obtaining more than $100,000 under false pretenses. The
Sixth Circuit noted that his whereabouts at the time of the Commissioner's assessment
of deficiencies was apparently unknown. Shortly after her husband's conviction, the
petitioner filed suit for divorce which was granted in February, 1967.
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the ground that the placing of her signature on the joint returns was
not a voluntary act because of the fraud of her husband."3 The Tax
Court found that the petitioner did not participate in the embezzlement
and had no knowledge that her husband failed to report the illegal funds
as income. Furthermore, the court found that although she obtained no
benefit from the funds, she had signed the returns voluntarily. 4 The
Tax Court, however, by virtue of section 6013 (d) (3), held the petitioner
liable for the tax due on the unreported funds. The court stated:
We have no equitable power to grant relief to petitioner however
distasteful the result herein may appear. . . . All we can do is
emphasize what we said in Scudder: 'Although we have much
sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and we are appalled
at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the inflexible
statute leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that
only remedial legislation can soften the impact of the rule of
strict individual liability for income taxes on the married
women who are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by
filing joint returns.'55
On petition to review the decision of the Tax Court, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for further development of all the conditions
surrounding the petitioner's signing of the joint returns. 6 The signi-
ficance of the Sixth Circuit's opinion is its indication that prior case law
concerning fraud as a defense5 7 should be extended to include one
53. There has been much confusion in the courts as to what constitutes a defense
of fraud. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. At least one court had previously
held that fraud is not present where one spouse merely fails to inform the other that
funds have been illegally omitted from their joint return. Scudder v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), affd, 410 F2d
686 (6th Cir. 1969). The petitioner in Huelsman, however, apparently argued that her
husband's nondisclosure of the omitted funds should have been sufficient for a finding
that her signature was procured by fraud and therefore was involuntary.
54. The Tax Court presumably reasoned that because the returns were voluntarily
signed the defense of fraud was not applicable.
55. Betty Bell Huelsman, 37 P-H TAX CT. MEm. 486, 487 (1968) (citation
omitted).
56. Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1969). Although the
Tax Court had held that the petitioner signed the joint returns voluntarily, the Sixth
Circuit determined that all the evidence surrounding the signing of the joint returns was
not fully developed before the Tax Court. Id. at 479. The dissenting opinion, however,
stated :
[W]e are bound by that [the Tax Court's] finding of fact unless it is
clearly erroneous. Allen Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
414 F.2d 983 (Sixth Cir. Aug. 29, 1969). We should not hold that it is
[erroneous], because petitioner has admitted both by stipulation and by
sworn testimony that her signature was voluntary.
Id. at 482.
57. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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spouse's nondisclosure to the other that income had been omitted from
the joint return.
[P]etitioner was fraudulently induced to sign a return which
she obviously would not have signed had the embezzled money
been included in it; and, the presence of actual fraud has
historically been considered as grounds for relief to the
aggrieved party. 8
The disposition of the case,"9 however, makes it uncertain whether
the Sixth Circuit held that the petitioner's signature was procured by
fraud because of her husband's nondisclosure. The court first unequivo-
cally stated that the "petitioner was fraudulently induced to sign" and
then decried the lack of findings by the Tax Court pertaining to the
signing."0 It is, therefore, unclear whether the court actually intended to
extend the defense of fraud to include nondisclosure. The court stated
that the petitioner was "fraudulently induced" to sign the returns but
gave no reason for this conclusion and made no attempt to define what
it meant by fraud. The only justification given for this conclusion was
the court's impression that Congress could not have intended such a
harsh result in cases involving an innocent spouse. The court stated:
It is said by the Tax Court that it has no power to grant
equitable relief and that only remedial legislation can soften
the impact of the rule. Whatever may be the distinction between
an equitable and legal defense, the Tax Court apparently
recognized that an innocent spouse may avoid liability by
proving duress or that the return was signed by mistake.
Both of these are usually considered as equitable defenses.
Relief from trickery and fraud could just as well rest on the
same principle especially when it is shown that the innocent
spouse did not benefit directly or indirectly from the stolen
funds. On the subject of remedial legislation, it may be assumed
we think, that Congress does not desire that the tax laws, as
presently written, be interpreted so as to inflict an appallingly
harsh result on an innocent person."1
Although the court's rationale concerning the defense of fraud was un-
clear, the opinion clearly portrayed the then existing difficulties inherent
58. 416 F.2d at 481.
59. See note 56 supra.
60. 416 F.2d at 481.
61. Id.
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in absolving an innocent spouse from joint and several liability. In
addition, the court's suggestion that a spouse's knowledge of and benefit
from unreported funds should be the criterion in evaluating whether joint
and several liability should be applied, provided a basis for subsequent
congressional action in this area.62
On remand, the Tax Court found that the petitioner voluntarily
signed the returns under no coercion from her husband, that she was
not deceived as to what she signed, that she knew and intended the
returns to be joint returns and that she would not have signed the
returns if she had known them to be dishonest." Although the Tax
Court noted that the Sixth Circuit's opinion suggested that the non-
disclosure by petitioner's husband was the equivalent of fraud, the
petitioner was nevertheless held jointly and severally liable. The Tax
Court reasoned that if the Sixth Circuit had ruled that the petitioner's
signature procured by fraud, a judgment for the petitioner would have
been rendered instead of remanding the case. In determining whether
the petitioner's signature was procured by fraud, the Tax Court
relied upon the Restatement of Contracts definition of fraud in the
inducement and fraud in the execution. 4 The court reasoned that "[t]o
hold that such nondisclosure rises to the level of fraud or trickery in the
execution of the return would ...open a Pandora's Box to avoidance
of liability on joint returns."6
Although the Tax Court held the petitioner liable, it was reluctant
to do so and apparently found some merit in the Sixth Circuit's sugges-
tion that liability should not attach to a spouse who has no knowledge
of nor benefit from the unreported funds. The Tax Court stated:
We would welcome a rule which would grant relief to a
victimized spouse who has no knowledge of, and does not
benefit from, unreported income, at least where that income
is the fruit of crime. But we regretfully see no way in which
this Court can or should engraft such a "doing equity" rule
on the language of section 6013(d) (3). We think such a result
should be properly accomplished by ameliorating legislation.66
The court's recognition of the knowledge and benefit tests to evaluate
the defense of fraud was proper and its request for a rule granting relief
62. INT. REV. CODEof 1954, § 6013(e).
63. Betty Bell Wissing, 54 T.C. 1428 (1970).
64. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS § 475, 476 (1932). See note 47 supra.
65. Betty Bell Wissing, 54 T.C. 1428, 1431 (1970).
66. Id. it 1432.
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to innocent spouses was quickly answered."
SECTION 6013(e) : THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Strict judicial interpretation of section 6013(e), which for many
years had held innocent spouses jointly and severally liable on joint
income tax returns, finally prompted Congress to take action."8 The
result, 9 section 6 013(e), which amends section 6013, states:
(e) SPousE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES.
(1) IN GENERAL.-Under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this
section for a taxable year and on such return there
was omitted from gross income an amount properly
includable therein which is attributable to one spouse
and which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount
of gross income stated in the return,
(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing
the return he or she did not know of, and had no
reason to know of, such omission, and
67. The Tax Court's decision is presently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit for a
second determination.
68. It is probable that the Huelsrnan litigation played an important role in focusing
congressional attention on the inequities created by such strict interpretation. See notes
50-51 supra and accompanying text. The Huelsman litigation also aroused numerous
commentaries which may also have prompted congressional action. See Note, Innocent
Spouses' Liability for Fraudulent Understatement of Taxable Income on Joint Returns,
56 VA. L. REv. 1268 (1970); 22 ALA. L. REv. 591 (1970); 83 HARv. L. REv. 1449
(1970) ; 39 U. CsI. L. REv. 205 (1970).
A bill to relieve innocent spouses from joint and several liability was introduced into
the House of Representatives on October 14, 1970. H.R. 19774, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). The bill was reported in the House of Representatives on December 14, 1970,
and was passed on December 22, 1970. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The bill was reported in the Senate on December 30, 1970, and was passed on December
31, 1970. S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It was signed into law by the
President on January 12, 1971. Act of January 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, §§1, 2, 3,
84 Stat. 2063.
69. Act of January 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, §§ 1, 2, 3, 84 Stat. 2063. This
Act contains three sections: 1) INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e), amending INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 6013; 2) INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653(b), amending INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 6653 providing that a spouse will not be held liable for the fraud penalty
when there is an omission of reportable income if the omission was not due to her
fradulent conduct (see Note, Collateral Estoppel in Tax Fraud Litigation: The Elimina-
tion of Joint and Several Liability, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 636 (1971)) ; and section 3) provid-
ing that the amendments made by this Act apply to all taxable years to which the Internal
Revenue Cade of 1954 applies. The third section of this Act could, therefore, provide
relief to innocent spouses who presently have cases on appeal. See note 67 supra.
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(C) taking into account whether or not the other
spouse significantly benefited directly or indirectly
from the items omitted from gross income and taking
into account all other facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the
deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to
such omission,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (in-
cluding interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such tax-
able year to the extent that such liability is attributable to
such omission from gross income.
(2) SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes of paragraph (1)-
(A) the determination of the spouse to whom
items of gross income (other than income from
property) are attributable shall be made without
regard to community property laws, and
(B) the amount omitted from gross income shall
be determined in the manner provided by section
6501 (e) (1) (A). 7'
Although this addition to section 6013 provides clarification of the
uncertainties which previously existed, it is questionable whether the
prior inequity72 of holding an innocent spouse jointly and severally
liable will be completely abolished.
To qualify for the congressional exemption, a spouse must meet
three conditions simultaneously " in order to be held innocent and
therefore relieved of joint and several liability. A spouse must establish
that: 1) the omitted income is attributable to the "other" spouse and that
such omission is greater than 25 percent of the total gross income stated
on the return; 2) in signing the return he or she had no knowledge
nor any reason to know of the omitted income;" and 3) he or she
70. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013 (e).
71. See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
73. That such a spouse must meet all three conditions is apparent from both the
structure of section 6013 (e) (1) and the House Committee on Ways and Means report
which states: "First, the bill provides that when these conditions exist, the 'innocent
spouse' is to be relieved of liability. . . ." H.R. REP,. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1970). See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e) (1).
74. NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e) (1) (A).
75. Id. § 6013(e) (1) (B).
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received no significant benefit from the omitted funds."6
The first condition which a spouse must meet to be found innocent
is separated into three parts: first, that there must be an omission of
reportable income from the joint return; second, that the omitted income
must be attributable to the other spouse; and third, that such income
must total more than 25 percent of the total gross income stated on the
return." The first part of section 6013(e) (1) (A) only applies to
situations involving the omission of reportable income." Therefore,
this section will not allow a spouse to become innocent if the tax
deficiency is caused by improper or illegal deductions. It is submitted that
such a distinction may be unwarranted. Since it is possible for a wife to
have no knowledge of omissions of reportable income, it is equally possible
that she could be unaware of improper deductions. Therefore, one
writer has suggested that
some may regard it more appropriate to accord relief in
situations involving items not appearing on the face of the
return than in situations involving items appearing thereon
and subject to the analysis of a questioning spouse. And yet
it is a rare wife who, when presented with a return prepared
by her husband, raises any questions save one concerning
the proper place for her signature."9
The committee reports8" contain no rationale for the limitation of this
section to omissions and it is probable that Congress simply overlooked
the possible tax liability for illegal deductions which may be imposed
upon innocent spouses.8 It is suggested, therefore, that Congress should
reconsider section 6013(e) (1) (A) and incorporate a provision which
would allow an innocent spouse to be exonerated from liability in situa-
tions involving improper deductions.
Not only must a spouse's potential liability be predicated upon
omitted income, but such income must also be attributable to the other
76. Id.
77. Id. § 6013(e) (1) (A).
78. Although the Huelsman decision involved a fraudulent omission, Congress did
not qualify the word "omission" in section 6013(e) (1) (A) with the adjective "fraudu-
lent." Therefore, it seems that both fraudulent and nonfraudulent omissions are within
the meaning of the section.
79. Emory, New Law Alleviates Innocent Spouse-Joint Return Problem on
Omitted Income, 34 J. TAXATION 154 (1971).
80. See H.R. RrP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
81. Such an oversight may have been caused by the cases involving only omissions
of reportable income which focused congressional attention on the plight of the innocent
spouse. See note 68 supra.
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spouse. The second part of section 6013(e) (1) (A) requires that the
omitted income must not be earned or owned by the spouse seeking
exemption from liability. This requirement stems from the concept that
income denotes economic control or benefit and one who obtains such
control or benefit may be validly taxed thereon.82 Apparently, if the wife
who is seeking exemption from liability has economic control over the
omitted income, this section will be inapplicable to her. Such a result is
proper because when the omitted income is attributable to the spouse it is
probable that she would have knowledge of the omission.88 In connec-
tion with the tests of economic control and benefit, the special rule of
section 6013 (e) (2) interprets section 6013 (e) (1) as follows:
[T]he determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attribut-
able shall be made without regard to community property
laws. . ."
Community property income is attributable to both spouses under com-
munity property law;85 however, for purposes of section 6013(e)(1),
a husband's wages will be attributable only to him, regardless of whether
he resides in a community property state or one which adheres to the
common law."
In addition to the requirement that the omitted income be attribut-
able to the "other spouse," section 6013(e) (1) (A) also imposes the
condition that the sum of the omitted funds be "in excess of 25 percent
of the amount of gross income stated in the return." This provision is
unwarranted and unrelated to the dilemma of the innocent spouse. The
only explanation given by the House Committee on Ways and Means
for this provision is that it
82. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61 (a). See 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §§ 5.01-03 (1969).
The requirement that the omitted income must be attributable to the other spouse is
similar to the benefit test of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e) (1) (C). If the omitted
income is attributable to the innocent spouse, she will be presumed to have benefited from
it and, therefore, be jointly and severally liable.
83. Emory, New Law Alleviates Innocent Spouse-Joint Return Problem on
Omitted Income, 34 J. TAXATION 154 (1971).
84. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 60 1 3(e) (2).
85. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
86. Innocent spouses residing in community property states have previously been
held jointly and severally liable for omissions on joint returns partially because they
are considered owners of one-half of the omissions. See Gertrude Abrams, 53 T.C. 24
(1969); Carmen Ramos, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 840 (1969). See also Emory, New Law
Alleviates Innocent Spouse-Joint Return Problem on Omitted Income, 34 J. TAXATION
154 (1971).
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is intended to limit the relief provided in the bill to those cases
where the income omitted represents a significant amount
relative to the reported income. Whether or not an omission
meets this test is to be determined in a manner similar to
the test applied under existing law in determining, for purposes
of the 6 year statute of limitations, when an omission in
excess of 25 percent of gross income exists.87
Under this provision an otherwise innocent spouse would be held jointly
and severally liable if her husband omitted to report as income $25,000
which he had embezzled and the gross income stated on their joint
return is in excess of $100,000. Such liability would attach because
the amount omitted is less than 25 percent of the couple's stated gross
income and therefore would be deemed insignificant. This standard
contains two variables which are arbitrary and capricious in their dif-
fering applications. First, liability is predicated upon the amount of
gross income stated on the couple's joint return. If, for instance, the
husband omits to report as income $25,000 which he had embezzled and
falsely states on their joint return that their gross income was $110,000
rather than the true amount of $90,000 (excluding the omission), the
wife would be held liable as the stated amount was falsely inflated and
therefore the omitted amount would not meet the 25 percent excess
requirement. Second, liability is predicated upon the amount of omitted
income which is not reported on their joint return. Therefore, if the
husband embezzled $24,900 and correctly stated on their joint return
that their gross income was $100,000 (excluding the omission),
the mere fact that he was not considerate enough to embezzle
another $100 will be sufficient to hold the wife liable according to the 25
percent excess requirement. Since both of these variables are outside of
the wife's control, any protection she may receive via section 6013(e) (1)
(A) is only fortuitous. Fate will often be the exclusive factor in deter-
mining whether an otherwise innocent spouse will be liable for the
omission.
The second condition a spouse must meet to be found innocent is
that she had no knowledge that income was omitted from the return
nor any reason to know of such an omission.8" This requirement appears
to be a codification of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Huelsman v. Com-
missioner89 which inferred that the nondisclosure of one spouse to the
87. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (emphasis added). The
statute of limitations provision is INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6501 (e) (1) (A).
88. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6013 (e) (1) (B).
89. 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
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other that income had been wrongfully omitted from a joint return
is the equivalent of fraud which will negate the innocent spouse's joint
and several liability.9" It is submitted that this requirement seems proper,
for if a spouse has knowledge that income has been omitted from a joint
return, he or she is also guilty of fraud"1 unless his or her signature is
obtained by duress.9" However, the desirability of the requirement of a
spouse's knowledge will to some extent depend upon the standards which
courts will use in its application. Although a spouse will have the
burden of establishing that he or she had no knowledge by a preponder-
ance of the evidence,9" exactly how lack of knowledge must be proven
is unclear. This uncertainty is caused by the requirement that a spouse
must have "no reason to know"94 that income has been omitted from
the joint return. Certain rhetorical questions are inescapable: must a
wife prove that she made inquiries of her husband concerning the
omitted income or that she had an accountant evaluate the records of her
family and her husband's business and thereby detemine that no income
was omitted? Perhaps such a searching inquiry on the part of the wife
is unnecessary in light of the recent Tax Court decision in 0. D. Cain."
The court, confronted with the knowledge requirement of section
6013 (e) (1 ) (B), stated:
We have carefully examined the testimony of both these peti-
tioners [the wives were joint petitioners with their husbands]
and conclude that they have established that in signing the
returns they neither knew of, nor had any reason to know of,
the omissions from gross income.98
Apparently, the court reasoned that proof of the knowledge requirement
can be satisfied with mere testimony. The favorable result of this case
may be somewhat illusory to subsequent innocent spouses since the
90. Id. at 481. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
91. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6653.
92. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that section
6013(e) does not foreclose the possibility that a defense of duress under prior law can
still be properly raised in factual situations where the spouse is not innocent as defined
by section 6013(e).
93. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
The second condition imposes on the innocent spouse the burden of showing
that he or she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, the omission
from income. It is intended that the spouse, in such a situation, will have the
usual burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on this issue and not
the higher burden required of the government in civil fraud cases.
Id.
94. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6013(e) (1) (B).
95. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. 1 71,045, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 207 (1971).
96. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
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petitioner's husbands were available to the Internal Revenue Service for
collection of deficiencies and penalties. One can only speculate as to the
result the court would have reached had the wives been the only sources
of collection. In cases where the wife is the sole source of collection, it
is suggested that the most stringent requirement consistent with the
"spirit" 7 of section 6013(e) (1) (B) should be the "reasonable man"
criterion. The congressional intent of section 6013(e), as evidenced by
the Committee reports,98 is to provide relief for the innocent spouse.
It would appear, therefore, that such intent will be best facilitated by an
objective determination of the amount of knowledge a reasonable spouse
should have had under the circumstances.
The third condition which a spouse must meet is that he or she
must have no significant benefit, either directly or indirectly, from the
omitted income." If such a spouse receives economic benefit from the
omitted income, the income should be attributable to him or her.' The
Committee reports' are helpful in determining whether a spouse has
received benefit from the omitted income.
The third condition requires a factual determination (by either
the Internal Revenue or the courts) as to whether the spouse
seeking relief from liability significantly benefited, directly
or indirectly, from the items omitted from gross income. It is
not intended that the term "benefit" as used here include
ordinary support of the innocent spouse. Unusual support or
transfers of property to the spouse would, however, constitute
"benefit" and should be taken into consideration. . . . Such
"benefit" may be received by the spouse several years after
the year in which the omitted item should have been included
in gross income. For example, if a spouse receives an in-
heritance of property or life insurance proceeds, and such
receipt is traceable to items omitted from gross income by the
other spouse in earlier years, that spouse will be considered
to have benefited from those items. A mere finding that the
spouse "benefited" from the items omitted from gross income
will not be sufficient, however, to prevent that spouse from
97. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No.
1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).
99. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e) (1) (C).
100. See 82 .supra and accompanying text.
101. H.R. RED. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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obtaining relief from liability for the tax. For the spouse to be
prevented from obtaining relief there must be a finding that the
benefit was "significant" and that "taking into account all
other facts and circumstances," it is not "inequitable to hold
the.. . spouse liable for the deficiency in tax." 0°
These guidelines for the determination of benefit, if adopted by the
courts, will provide fairness to the innocent spouse in most circumstances.
The criterion of "significant benefit," however, may prove troublesome.
For example, if $100,000 is omitted and a wife benefits from only
$5,000, will this amount be significant and therefore impose upon her
the liability for the entire amount? The Committee would leave such a
determination to the court's finding of inequity.' It is suggested that a
better alternative would be an apportionment of liability according to the
benefit received by the wife. Using this method, the amount of tax
liability in the above illustration would be predicated upon the benefited
$5,000, and therefore, the court's discretion in determining the equities
of each situation would be eliminated.
Another shortcoming of section 6013(e) (1) (C) is that it is un-
clear whether the Government has the burden of establishing that the
taxpayer benefited from the omitted funds. In 0. D. Cain,' the Tax
Court stated that
[i]t is . . . our opinion that their testimony [wives], in
effect, is sufficient to establish that they did not significantly
benefit from the items which we have found their husbands
omitted from gross income.'
The court's reasoning seems to indicate that the burden was placed on
the petitioners. Section 6013(e)(1)(C), however, unlike the explicit
provisions of section 6013 (e) (1) (B) 0 . is silent concerning upon whom
the burden of proof should be placed. It is fair to suggest that if the
burden properly belongs upon the petitioner, the statute would have
expressed this as in the knowledge requirement section. Since the statute
is silent, the Government should have the burden of proving that the
spouse, in fact, did benefit from the omitted funds.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); S. REP. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
103. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); S. RE'. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
104. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 71,045, 40 P-H Tax Ct Mem. 207 (1971).
105. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
106. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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The following statement in the Committee reports is helpful in
the interpretation of section 6013 (e) (1) (C).
Other factors which could also be taken into account in ap-
propriate situations, in determining whether it is inequitable
to hold the spouse liable for the deficiency include the fact of
whether the spouse in question is deserted or is divorced or
separated.11
7
Such language probably stems from the Committee's study of cases
similar to Huelsman, °8 where the Commissioner was unable to collect
the tax deficiencies from the husband because his whereabouts were
unknown.'0 9 However, factors such as divorce or separation could prove
detrimental to the understanding or forgiving spouse who does not want
a divorce, and therefore, the Committee's suggestion should not be
strictly adopted by the courts. A more logical interpretation of the
Committee's statement is that the judiciary may consider additional
factors in determining joint and several liability other than those expressly
included in section 6013 (e).
The combined effect of the three conditions which a spouse must
meet appears, at this early date, to severely limit the situations in which a
spouse will be exonerated from joint and several liability. Perhaps these
limitations were placed in this section because of the statement made by
the Tax Court in Betty Bell Wissing that "[t]o hold that . . .nondis-
closure rises to the level of fraud or trickery in the execution would, in
our opinion, open a Pandora's box to avoidance of liability on joint
returns."'10 Whatever validity may be found in such an argument has
been recognized in the three conditions a spouse must meet in order to be
found innocent. Judicial interpretation of section 6013(e) should be
liberal if adequate relief is to be provided the innocent spouse. Section
6013(e), if so interpreted, could appease those who have advocated the
complete abolition of joint and several liability". and provide the amelior-
ation needed in this area.
CONCLUSION
Section 6013(e) may partially eliminate the tax inequity which
is inherent in imposing joint and several liability upon an innocent
107. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970); S. PEP. No. 1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
108. 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
109. See note 52 supra.
110. 54 T.C. 1428, 1432 (1970).
111. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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spouse. Its success, however, will depend to a large extent upon the
interpretation and application adopted by the judiciary. Strict judicial
construction of the requirements of "significant omissons,"" 2 "reasonable
knowledge" '  and "substantial benefit"" 4 would easily circumvent the
congressional intent 15 behind section 6013 (e). It is suggested, therefore,
that the judiciary apply the "reasonable man" criterion in interpreting
section 6013 (e) (1) (B) "' and apportion the tax liability according to
the actual benefit received by the innocent spouse in interpreting section
6013(e) (1) (C). 1 7 These suggestions, if followed by the judiciary,
would eliminate two of the adverse restrictions of section 6013(e).
Since the judiciary is limited in latitude to only interpretation,
Congress should reduce or eliminate the 25 percent excess requirement
of "significant omissions""' and also consider whether illegal deductions
should be included in section 6013(e) (1) (A)."' Although one writer
has stated that "[t]he statute is . . . a commendable and valid con-
gressional response to what was a most serious problem,"' 20 it is the
opinion of this writer that the amendment as enacted is too narrow in
its approach and, therefore, inadequate in its protection. There are too
many restrictive and fortuitous conditions within the amendment which
may impose unwarranted liability on otherwise innocent spouses. The
ultimate tax liability of a spouse should not be predicated upon events
which are outside of her control.
112. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(e) (1) (A).
113. Id. § 6013 (e) (1) (B).
114. Id. § 6013(e) (1) (C).
115. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP.
No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
116. See notes 88-98 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 99-106 supra and accompanying text.
118. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
120. Emory, New Law Alleviates Innocent Spouse-Joint Return Problem on
Omitted Income, 34 J. TAXATION 154, 156 (1971).
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